APPENDIX D 417 



order in the world of ultimate reality — an order necessarily 

 based upon the autonomy of the individual mind — we 

 must abandon what may be called " creationism " ; must 

 abandon it in all its forms, and preeminently in the two 

 forms which have coine into such serious conflict since the 

 middle of the nineteenth century — I mean, of course, 

 ( I ) the old dualistic (or transcendent) creationism of Hebraic 

 theology, and (2) the later monistic (or immanential) crea- 

 tionism of Hegelianism and the evolutionary philosophy. 

 If freedom is to be saved, I show it must be saved through 

 such an idealism as replaces this " efficient " view of causa- 

 tion by a view purely final, or ideal, as the principle by 

 which God sustains and rules the world. But, supposing 

 this established, how do we know that a free world is a 

 fact? If freedom requires that the soul shall be coexistent 

 with God ill eternity, — that is, in the world of spontaneous 

 first causes, — how are we to prove that freedom and such 

 a world of coexistent self-active beings are both realities ? 



I answer here as I have answered in the book : By 

 proving the reality of a priori knowledge in the individual. 

 And for the detail of this proof I again refer readers to 

 the first, to the third, and to the sixth essay. 



IV 



THE SYSTEM NOT A SUBJECTIVE BUT AN OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 



The reviewer's own habitual way of philosophising has 

 led him, finally, into misconceiving my form of idealism as 

 one-sided and merely subjective. " It remains to note," 

 he says, " what seems a confusion of ideas, reappearing 

 from point to point of the argument, in a failure to recog- 

 nise the distinction betvveen a subjective and an objective 

 view of the universe. It is human thought which organises 

 the motley phenomena presented to the senses into the 

 majestic order called Nature. And this is reasonable 



2E 



