APPENDIX E 421 



putable. But only some of us set this pluralism forth by 

 an idealistic method, and hence arrive at what we call the 

 "eternity" of the many minds. By this we mean simply 

 their absolute reality, or the self-based, self-active nature 

 of their being, — nothing else at all, except as something 

 else may be implied by this absoluteness ; least of all, do 

 we mean merely their everlastingness, their existence 

 "from all eternity," as the common sajang is. Our doc- 

 trine has nothing whatever to do with the superstition, 

 born of fancy, about preexistence. In this matter I sup- 

 pose Mr. McTaggart to be in entire accord with me, and 

 I am therefore somewhat surprised to note in his review 

 certain misapprehensions of my position. These I will 

 now specify. 



(i) He speaks of my doctrine that only an eternal being 

 can really be free, as a " remark." This language is seri- 

 ously misleading ; the reader must surely get from it the 

 impression that my statement of this view is merely inci- 

 dental and by the way. On the contrary, it is in fact basic 

 and central to the whole theory of my book, is developed 

 with emphatic prominence, and is argued out with much 

 detail. (See my pp. 326-343.) 



(2) A more important misapprehension is this : " It [the 

 system of Personal Idealism] offers a God of whom per- 

 sonality, moraUty, and affection can reasonably be predi- 

 cated, since, though perfect, he is finite. (I am not sure 

 if the author would accept the word ' finite,' but in effect, 

 it seems to me, he holds God to be finite, since he makes 

 him one of a community of spirits, each of whom has ' a 

 reality as inexpugnable as his own.')" 



Indeed I do not accept the word, nor can. I am sur- 

 prised that my real view in this matter should have escaped 

 Mr, McTaggart. So far from holding God to be finite, I 

 hold, and in the book clearly teach, that all minds are infi- 

 nite (in the true qualitative sense of the word), and God 



