426 ESSAYS LV PHILOSOPHY 



Type to be one of the series of really possible beings, "and 

 consequently that a being exists who realises the Type." 



II 



RELATIONS TO KANT, CATEGORIES VS. SENSE-FORMS, MONO- 

 THEISM, MISUSE OF THE NAME GOD 



But enough of these misapprehensions. I must now 

 turn to sundry difficulties that Mr. McTaggart finds with 

 some of the cardinal conceptions in my theory, or else 

 widi my method of advocating them. 



(i) He complains that after going closely with Kant to 

 a certain point, I then suddenly separate myself, — "ab- 

 ruptly," as he says. By this he appears to mean my 

 rejection of Kant's restriction of all our cognition to 

 phenomena and denial of our power to know noumena. 

 He implies that I nowhere give any reasons for rejecting 

 Kant's criticisms on the Paralogism of Pure Reason, but 

 go on to maintain that pure reason can know' that the self 

 exists, and exists eternally, — simply ignoring these cele- 

 brated criticisms. It is a fact, of course, that I have not 

 felt it needful to reply in detail to the various branches of 

 Kant's agnostic doctrine, and especially not to his assault 

 upon the possibility of proving theoretically the freedom 

 and the immortality of the self. I have chosen to rely, 

 rather, on a general refutation of the agnostic motif, wdiich 

 I have supplied in my first essay ; and I have relied more 

 especially on the self-refutation of Kantian agnosticism by 

 its own inner dialectical dissolution, which I have traced 

 out in the fourth part of my third essay. These very 

 essential parts of my general argumentation, my reviewer 

 appears to have quite overlooked. No reader who omits 

 them will properly understand the argumentative pro- 

 cedure on which I rest my case in the seven essays taken 

 together. 



