428 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY 



whole problem of epistemology. This would need to be 

 taken up along Kant's own lines, and followed to the point 

 where (at the end of the Transcendetital Analytic) one gets 

 into the position to show that Kant has failed to establish 

 the objective character of even natural science, and just 

 why he has failed. It would then appear that in order to 

 give really objective value to a priori syntheses in Space 

 and Time, we must combine a pure use of the Categories 

 — a use unmixed with the Sense-Forms — with their use as 

 " schematised " with the help of these Forms. Thus we 

 should learn that there is no possible escape from the 

 transcendent use of the Categories, even when we attempt 

 to employ them only transcendentally. 



But not only did I feel that this epistemological inquiry 

 was at once too long and too subtle for the public to which 

 I chiefly addressed my book ; I was also, in the case of 

 more expert readers, relying upon a previous warning as 

 to the general path the inquiry must follow, which I had 

 given in my contribution to the volume entitled The Con- 

 ception of God, at pp. 124-127. Still, Mr. McTaggart is 

 quite right in pointing out that all this needs to be done in 

 full detail before one can claim to have made a proof of 

 Personal Idealism clear of all queries. And this I hope 

 some day yet to accomplish. 



(3) My reviewer finds a " weakness " in that part of my 

 argument concerning the existence of God which aims at 

 showing God's soleness (monotheism), in opposition to the 

 charge of " polytheism " or " apeirotheism " urged against 

 my proposition that all selves coexist with God in eternity. 

 He thinks the argument assumes " that beings who were 

 equally perfect could not be different from one another." 

 But it does not assume this, as I have already shown above, 

 when clearing up the misapprehension about perfection and 

 imperfection as applicable to the selves other than God. It 

 does assume, however, that no beings who are absolutely 



