436 



INDEX 



mate Being, though its kind may- 

 be ultimate, 30 ; its proximate seat 

 the human mind, 31. 



Cosmic Consciousness, not equiva- 

 lent to Personal God, 7. 



Cosmic Theism, evolutional theory of, 

 3 ; rightly requires a self-conscious 

 Noumenon, 43 ; inconclusive as to 

 immortality, 43 ; hostile to freedom, 

 43; only another name for pan- 

 theism, 269. 



Creation, Divine, not by efficient 

 causation, xvi, 331 seq. ; real mean- 

 ing of, xvii, 65, 75, 354 seq.; as 

 human attribute toward Nature, 

 48 seq., and in art, 188, 199 ; by 

 fiat, contradicts freedom, 332 seq., 

 344; monistic theories of, have 

 same defect, 345 seq. ; only com- 

 patible with freedom, if symbolis- 

 ing final causation, 347 seq. 



Criticism, Kantian principle of, re- 

 lation of Personal Idealism to, 

 426 seq.; thoroughly "critical" 

 character of theory propounded in 

 present book, 426-427, cf. 385 and 

 160-170. 



Czolbe, his naturalistic philosophy, 

 and relation to Lotze, 122 vote. 



Darwin, relation of Neo-Hegelianism 

 to, 4; Diihring on, 132. 



Davidson, Dr. Thomas, his " apeiro- 

 theism," 361, note 2. 



Defect, involved in self-definition 

 against the Perfect, 362 ; factor in 

 all free beings other than God, 363 ; 

 basis conditional for phenomenal 

 consciousness, and for Nature, 365 

 seq. ; involves risk of sin, or moral 

 evil, 367 ; capable of reformation 

 and cure by freedom, 369 seq. 



Deism, defined, 58, 69 ; its limitations 

 and its merit, 70, 71. 



Descartes, overlooks primordial al- 

 truism of self-consciousness, xxxiii ; 

 disapproves extravagant claims of 

 natural science, 95 ; employs On- 

 tological Proof of God, 356; de- 

 monstrates reality of individual 



self, 357; illustrates Ontological 

 Proof as case of necessary connex- 

 ion, 357 ; pertinently criticises 

 Anselm, 358 ; his own Ontological 

 Proof criticised, 358, and supple- 

 mented, 359. 



Determinism, as predestination, in- 

 compatible with freedom, 318; as 

 simple definiteness, wholly com- 

 patible with freedom, 320; "The 

 Dilemma of," Prof. James on, 322 

 note, 372 seq. [See next article, 

 and also Freedom^ 



Determinism and Freedom, logical 

 analysis of the essay on, xl-xliii, 

 386-387; problem of their har- 

 monisation, 313, 318 ; reconcilable, 

 though neither identical nor tend- 

 ing to merge in one, 314; but 

 irreconcilable, (i) if determinism 

 means predestination, 318, (2) if 

 it cancels choice or alternative, 319, 

 (3) if freedom means caprice, 319, 

 320; harmonise, if (i) determinism 

 means simple definiteness, and (2) 

 freedom means the definiteness of 

 spontaneous intelligence, or Rea- 

 son, 320; shown to mean these, 

 respectively, 321 seq. ; their har- 

 mony possible only by an idealistic 

 philosophy of Nature, 325, means 

 not inerely a harmony of their 

 ideas, but of their operation in real 

 persons, 326 seq., hence, reaches 

 maximum of difficulty in case of 

 God's determinism and man's free- 

 dom, 327; their reconciliation im- 

 possible, if Divine creation means 

 efficient causation, 332 seq. ; their 

 harmonisation forces search after 

 substitute for efficient causation, 

 335 seq., takes human freedom to 

 involve eternity {i.e. self-activity) 

 of man, 338, hence, resulting plu- 

 ralism seems (i) to erase individ- 

 uality, 340 (2) to conclude either 

 in polytheism or in atheism, 340, 

 but solution of Divine-human an- 

 tinomy is found in Final Causa- 

 tion, as truth of the metaphor in 



