INDEX 



443 



his implication true, that evolution 1 

 cannot produce our consciousness 

 of Time, 20 seq. ; his "causality 

 with freedom " identified with Final 

 Cause, 38 ; rightly makes sensa- 

 tion point to noumena, 49 ; rejects 

 extravagant claims of scientific 

 method, 95 ; shows reason legisla- 

 tive over Nature, 98 itote ; dis- 

 torted by Neo-Kantianism into 

 supporting empiricism, 102; his 

 Thing-in-itself identified with Will 

 by Schopenhauer, 107 ; and with 

 Unconscious by Hartmann, no; 

 his empirical limits of knowledge 

 attacked by latter, no, in; his 

 "antinomies" assailed by Diih- 

 ring, 125-129; Fall back on, the 

 rallying-cry of Lange, i^j, but his 

 " primacy of practical reason " is 

 denied, 146, and his a priori settle- 

 ment of " elements " is shifted to 

 induction, 147; his Thing-in-itself 

 reduced to mere " limiting notion," 

 149 ; same, erroneously confounded 

 with " things as they are" 160 note ; 

 cited by Prof. James, on sense- 

 world as restrictive of our think- 

 ing, 286; impugns Ontological 

 Proof, 356; his world of "pure 

 reason," as embracing Nature 

 under it, 306, 366; his restriction 

 of knowledge to phenomena dis- 

 solved by the tacit self-criticism of 

 Lange, and his doctrine of auton- 

 omy thus given theoretical basis, 



385. 

 Knowledge, centres in conscience as 

 cognition of World of Spirits, xiii, 

 xxxvii, 174-175, 310, 312, 353, 361; 

 problem of ils possibility tiie fun- 

 damental issue in philosophy, 17; 

 petitio regarding, made by agnostic 

 evolutionism, 17-21; contradic- 

 tions regarding, in same, ii-i^; a 

 priori, proofs of, 46-47, 297 seq., 

 300-301,306,309,310,311-312; re- 

 ality of a priori, proves personal 

 immortality, 298, 302, 304 seq., 307, 

 308, 310, and also worth of same. 



309 seq., and constitutes essence of 

 real freedom, 322-323, 325, 329, 333, 

 362seq., 369-371, 373, 375, 380; con- 

 stitutes also, fundamental proof of 

 Personal Idealism, xlviiseq.,4i4seq. 



Lange, life-sketch of, 104 ; his History 

 0/ Alaf trial ism, 105, 143; his gen- 

 eral aim and its ethical motive, 143 ; 

 his return to Kant, 144; his recog- 

 nition of the truth in materialism and 

 in idealism, 144, 145 ; makes the 

 Ideal not a philosophy, but a stand- 

 point, 145, 146; states negative and 

 positive functions of philosophy, 

 146 ; criticises Kant, 146 seq. ; at- 

 tacks Kant's " primacy of practical 

 reason," and his a priori settle- 

 ment of a priori elements, 147 ; 

 makes cognition and will wholly 

 phenomenal, 147; holds a priori 

 elements must be discovered by 

 induction, 147; adds motion to the 

 list of these, 147 ; counts sense- 

 world explicable on mechanical 

 principles, 148 ; declares Thing-in- 

 itself merely " limiting Jiotion" 149 ; 

 makes " limits of knowledge of 

 Nature " limits of all knowledge, 

 149; considers our hypostasis of 

 " limiting notion " an orgariic illu- 

 sion, 150; hence makes metaphys- 

 ics, religion, poetry, sprung from 

 this illusion, all work of imagina- 

 tion, an effect of the " Ideal," 151 ; 

 holds balance between optimism 

 and pessimism, 152, 153 ; his ethics 

 chiefly fortitude and resignation, 

 154; his sociology a stern social- 

 ism, 154; his philosophy of reli- 

 gion a reduction to the bare Ideal, 

 155 ; merits and defects of his 

 " standpoint of the Ideal," 155-159 ; 

 self-diisolution of his agnosticism, 

 159-169; his movement in fact es- 

 tablishes absolute quality in our 

 knowledge, 170, supplies a Critique 

 of all Scepticism, 170, and a defini- 

 tive Critique of all Materialism, 

 171, cf. 148 note; in effect, opens 



