446 



INDEX 



with sensuous theism, 71 ; contribu- 

 tion of, toward genuine theism, 72, 

 73 ; fatal sliortcoming of, compared 

 with demands of religion, 75, 76; 

 contradicts real freedom, and im- 

 mortality with worth, 77; truth or 

 falsity of, not settled by this, but 

 its human significance is, 77-81 ; 

 suggested by modern science, 

 (i) through empirical method, 83- 

 86, (2) through this resulting in 

 conservation and dissipation of 

 energy, and in evolution, 87-93; 

 not really warranted by science, 

 94-97 ; entire neutrality toward, on 

 part of strict science, 97, 98 ; neces- 

 sary, as stage of thought prepara- 

 tory to genuine theism, 99; needs 

 to be transcended, 100. 



Parallelism, Psychological, not strictly 

 construed by Prof. James, 295 ; ex- 

 actly interpreted, is not obstacle, 

 but key, to personal immortality, 

 296 seq. ; concomitancy of its two 

 streams explained by unity of Time 

 as pure act of soul, 300 seq., 386. 



Parmenides, among undoubted pan- 

 theists, 63. 



Peabody, Dr. A. P., in Concord 

 "symposium" on pantheism, 56 

 note. 



Person, sign and test of true, x ; real, 

 disappears in all evolutional philos- 

 ophy, 6, 7; Imman, in same, merely 

 phenomenal, or else modal, 8, 43 ; 

 defined, by its essence, 52; the, 

 sovereign over Nature, 54, 306, 325 ; 

 each, focal point in universe of 

 minds, 172 .seq. ; to each, world- 

 whole somewise present, 173 ; each, 

 a transcending unity of subject and 

 cause, 174; each, in art, a literal 

 creator, 198 seq. ; divine functions 

 of each, in religion of Jesus, 255 

 seq.; each, in same, recognised by 

 God as free, 256 ; self-active nature 

 of, proved, 299-302 ; every, essen- 

 tially social in root of self-con- 

 sciousness, xiii, 310-312, 359; how 

 numerated, in world of persons, 



354, 363, note I ; the Supreme, de- 

 fined as God by eternal self-fulfil- 

 ment, 355 ; eve;'y, unrepeatable, 362 

 seq. ; each, other than God, self- 

 defined against God, 363, cf. 355 ; 

 every, except God, joins two antag- 

 onistic natures in its unity, 364; 

 each, from this inner conflict, liable 

 to sin, 367 ; yet holds in its idealis- 

 ing freedom a recovering Atone- 

 ment, 376 seq. 



Personal Idealism, why so called, 

 viii-x, 389 ; outlined, xii-xviii, 390- 

 392 ; relations of, to Berkeley, xviii- 

 xix, to Kant, xix-xxii, xxxiv-xxxviii, 

 426, to Leibnitz, xxiii-xxv, to Aris- 

 totle, xxv-xxvi, to the Oxford Es- 

 sayists, xxx-xxxii, 405-408, and to 

 views of Davidson and of McTag- 

 gart, 389 seq. ; two theories, quite 

 diverse, going by the name of, 

 xxxi ; not to be confounded with 

 Subjective Idealism, xxxii seq., 

 384, 400 seq., 417 seq. ; how con- 

 trasted (i) with monism, and (2) 

 with elder monotheism, 383; put 

 on critical basis by self-criticism of 

 Lange, 385; the proofs of, tlieir 

 real nature and their actual pres- 

 ence, xl-xliv, xlvi-xlviii, 414 seq.; 

 interprets God by final cause, how, 

 391, and how, the Divine Offices 

 of Creation and Regeneration, 392, 

 cf. 329 seq. and 342 seq. ; its moral 

 necessity and practical bearings, 

 389 seq. ; alone really solves prob- 

 lem of Freedom, 399, of Immor- 

 tality, 401, of Evil, 402, and of the 

 reality of God, 403; not atheism, 

 351-361, cf. 268-278 ; not polythe- 

 ism, 361-372; not chaotic indi- 

 vidualism, 409 seq. ; not the theoiy 

 ofpreexistence,4i2Seq. ; omissions 

 of, in present exposition, relative 

 to Kant, 426. 



Personal Idealism, the Oxford volume 

 called, XXX ; views in, contrasted 

 with those in present book, xxxi 

 seq., 405 seq. ; prior right of latter 

 to title, xxxi seq., 405 seq. ; points 



