ii6 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM 



ised beings, the organs exhibiting these ends may be 

 traced back to states where those " ends," by a gradual 

 process of minimisation, seem to pass into accidental 

 " results," and so one cannot at last draw any sharp line 

 between them. 



Mr. Herbert Spencer, in tracing conduct from such 

 random motions as are executed by pseudopodia, to the 

 actions of higher animals, which seem to show definite 

 ends, points out how the gradations are complete — say, 

 from the swimming of an infusorium to the habits of a 

 cephalopod, or from those of an ascidian to an elephant. 

 It is just this which renders the attempts to limit finality 

 with any degree of precision so difficult a task. 



This difficulty, if I mistake not, is scarcely brought 

 out with sufficient precision by M. Janet. It may, there- 

 fore, indicate a line of objection to finality, as it un- 

 doubtedly would be to the old views of teleology. 



In his sixth chapter of the first book on " Objections 

 and Difficulties," M. Janet refers to M. Littre's view that 

 " the property of matter of accommodating itself to ends 

 — of adjusting itself, as he says — is one of the properties 

 of organised matter. It is of the essence of this matter 

 to adapt itself to ends as it is of its essence to contract 

 or expand, to move or to feel." ^ Our author takes M. 

 Littr^ to task for this expression. It is not Matter, but 

 Directivity, which guides matter to " ends ". Otherwise 

 the very existence of the animal and vegetable kingdoms 

 as they now are, cannot be accounted for. If Littr^ 

 meant that the protoplasm, say, of some reptile, through 

 some inherent power of adaptation, developed wings 

 instead of forelegs, and so produced a bird, such a de- 

 scription may sound absurd. But every evidence yet 



IP. 221. 



