FINAL CAUSES 125 



causes is not to be entertained. If we could absolutely 

 suspend the changes of the external conditions of life, 

 existing species would remain stationary. The action of 

 external inciting causes in the widest sense of the word 

 is alone able to produce modifications." Dr. Alfred R. 

 Wallace, who quoted the preceding in his review of Dr. 

 Weismann's work, Studies in the Theory of Descent, said 

 that he had " arrived at almost exactly similar conclusions 

 to these ".^ 



Whichever theory be adopted, the outcome is, of 

 course, the same — viz., structures which/^r se imperiously 

 suggest finality or design. But since the special creation 

 hypothesis is out of court, and Evolution only accepted, 

 design may be excluded, and the question stands. Does 

 finality remain ? If M. Janet's definition be accepted, 

 then as "ends " abound everywhere in organisms, finality 

 is qXso passijn. We are not concerned, be it remembered, 

 at present with the investigation as to how the complex 

 correlated structures do arise in response to either an 

 external or internal stimulus. 



Now, assuming finality to be recognised in Nature, it 

 must be either intentional or not. In the first book M. 

 Janet does not concern himself with intentionality. He 

 does not therein raise the question as to how the first 

 cause acts, but whether the second causes, as they are 

 given to us in experience, act for ends or not. Within 

 these limits, then, is the analogy between the industry of 

 man and that of Nature legitimate ? 



Taking as a starting point the consciousness of 

 personal finality in ourselves, we infer by analogy a 

 similar finality in other men ; " from finality in the in- 

 dustrious actions of other men, we pass to finality in the 



^Nature, vol. xxii., p. 141. Cf. p. 161. 



