126 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM 



industrious actions of animals, whether these actions 

 present the appearance of some foresight and reflection, 

 or appear to us absolutely automatic. We have now to 

 pass from the external actions of the animal, which are 

 called its instincts, to its internal operations, which are 

 called its functions. This is the kernel of our whole 

 deduction." ^ 



In tracking finality thus downwards, the reader will 

 at once perceive that the author considers finality as 

 equally characteristic of the voluntary and the automatic 

 acts of man, as well as the acts of all other animals 

 whether external and instinctive, or internal and func- 

 tional. 



He notices a " profound difference between functional 

 industry and human — namely, that artificial industry 

 constructs the machines it has need of to perform its 

 operations, while the animal functions are only the opera- 

 tions of machines already constructed. The man makes 

 pumps, but the animal has received from Nature a natural 

 pump, the heart. . . . Whatever be the cause that has 

 constructed it . . . is of little consequence ; in any case, 

 this cause in constructing this machine has performed a 

 series of operations entirely resembling those of a work- 

 man constructing analogous machines." ■-' 



The author then pertinently asks, " How could the 

 same machine be considered here as a collection of means 

 and ends, there as a simple coincidence of causes and 

 effects ? " Why is a spider's web a mere effect, but a 

 fishing net an end ? " Can we thus assign two absolutely 

 identical causes to two absolutely identical actions ?" And 

 M. Janet redefines finality under this comparison, observ- 

 ing that " in both cases there is-a twofold common char- 



1 P. 97. "" P. 99. 



