138 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM 



In the second book the author addresses himself to 

 solve the question whether there is a First Cause of 

 finality. Finality being a law of Nature, what is the first 

 cause of that law? The reply has ever been, Intellig- 

 ence. Is this conclusion legitimate ? 



The old teleological argument has ever been met by 

 the Epicurean view of chances. Atoms have an eternal 

 motion ; their fortuitous concourses must have already 

 exhausted infinite combinations, so that the one which 

 now exists is simply one of them. But this theory re- 

 quires infinite time for its accomplishment, and the most 

 modern views of the period spent in elaborating the 

 universe from nebulous matter still make it finite. But, 

 further, we are told that the existence of such combina- 

 tions of atoms fortuitously, as exist, is possible, because 

 it is. This is obviously to beg the whole question, for 

 the theory assumes that the universe is possible without 

 an intelligent cause. M. Janet justly remarks, "This 

 picture is possible, because it is ; it has, therefore, had 

 no painter," is just as logical. Logical possibility and 

 real possibility are confounded. 



The whole argument is, however, antiquated, and so 

 may be dismissed. The modern form of the objection 

 is that raised by Kant and other metaphysicians, who 

 point out that the argument of analogy cannot do more 

 than suggest an Architect, but not a Creator. It cannot 

 rise beyond suggesting a relatively wise, skilful, or power- 

 ful cause, but not an absolute one. This, however, 

 implies, observes M. Janet, that only the form of things 

 is contingent, and that matter is not so. " If matter is 

 not contingent, that means that it is necessary, — it exists 

 of it.self, it has in itself the reason of its existence ; . . . 

 for the same reason we must suppose the cause that 

 gives the form to be necessary on the same ground as 



