FINAL CAUSES 139 



the matter itself, and that it is self-existent. How, in 

 short, can it be admitted that a non-necessary cause 

 would have the power to act on a necessary matter and 

 to give it orders ? . . . The processus in injinitiivi would 

 here avail nothing, for by hypothesis the matter supposed 

 necessary is also a last term ; therefore, on the other 

 hand, the cause must likewise be a last term." ^ 



This argument strikes one as irrefragable, and the 

 conclusion is obvious, that the organising cause of the 

 world is a cause of itself or an Absolute Cause. 



Kant's second objection falls with the first, namely, 

 that "from a contingent world we cannot rise to an 

 absolute cause". "But the first objection," says our 

 author, " by the hypothesis of a pre-existent — that is, 

 necessary — matter, furnishes the material of the absolute 

 idea of which I have need. If the first cause is absolute, 

 it will be so in all its attributes : being by hypothesis 

 intelligent, it will be omniscient ; being powerful, it will 

 be omnipotent ; being good, it will be perfectly good, 

 and so on." -^ 



These two objections of Kant, however, do not touch 

 the very essence of the argument, that Law and Order 

 imply Intelligence. 



Three solutions have been offered to account for the 

 existence of finality : the hypothesis of subjective finality, 

 that of immanent, and that of unconscious finality. 



The first is the doctrine of Kant, and M. Janet fully 

 admits " that there is something subjective in this doctrine, 

 namely, the part that is insusceptible of demonstration 

 and verification, and also the unknown part that goes on 

 always increasing in proportion as we approach the very 

 source of the creative activity. But then, again, the 



ip. 335. 'P- 336. 



