140 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM 



same doctrine is objective where it represents facts ; it 

 is real on the same ground as all induction that rises 

 from what is seen to what is not seen ". ^ 



That finality is internal or immanent is perfectly ad- 

 missible, " but this relative immanence of natural finality 

 does not imply an absolute immanence, and, on the contrary, 

 can only be comprehended by its relation to a transcendent 

 terminus. These two difficulties overcome, we are now 

 face to face with the true problem : Is the supreme 

 cause of finality an intelligent cause — a Mind? This 

 will be the object of our last inquiries." ^ 



Hegel says that finality is not merely immanent, it 

 is uncottscioiis. A striking illustration of unconscious 

 finality is seen in the instincts of animals ; which will be 

 sufficiently discussed hereafter. 



An unconscious finality, says Frauenstadt, is no con- 

 tradiction of terms, just as " the Aristotelian opposition 

 between the efficient and final cause is in no way identical 

 with the opposition between the unconscious and the 

 intelligent cause. For the final cause itself may be 

 unconscious." ^ 



" To attribute to Nature an instinctive activity is to 

 say that Nature acts like bees and the ant in place of 

 acting like man ; it is zoomorphism substituted for anthro- 

 pomorphism. We see no advantage in it. 



" In fact, the true difficulty, the profound difficulty, 

 in this question is that we can only explain the creative 

 activity of Nature by comparing it to something that is 

 in Nature itself — that is to say, which is precisely one of 

 the effects of that activity. . . . The true difficulty evi- 

 dently applies to the hypothesis of a primitive instinct 

 quite as well as to that of a primitive intelligence."' 



' Pp- 352, 353- '^ P- 375- " P- 377- "• P- 379- 



