ORIGIN OF MAN 213 



A time comes, however, in its mental development — 

 but you cannot say when — that its power of grasping the 

 idea of things which do not solely appeal to the senses 

 is attained. 



At this point it passes the limits of all animals ; which 

 stop short at sense perceptions with a corresponding 

 reasoning power upon concrete things only. 



This conclusion is the result of the study of the habits 

 of animals. It becomes more and more apparent that 

 their reasoning powers, which are often very considerable, 

 always concern concrete objects, which appeal to their 

 senses. But, besides doing this, man, and man alone, can 

 reason in abstract ideas as well. 



To make this clearer, I will quote a passage from my 

 book Christian Beliefs Reconsidered in the Light of Modern 

 Thought (1884, p. 61). 



" There is no reason, e.g., to suppose that any animal 

 in the wild or natural condition ever eats except when it 

 is hungry ; ^ and as soon as the instinct of hunger is 

 satisfied it ceases to do so. It undoubtedly derives a 

 certain amount of pleasure from the act of eating, as shown 

 by such as a man-eating tiger ; so far man may do the 

 same, but here enters the sharp line of distinction between 

 him and them, and upon which his whole moral nature 

 hinges ; a moral nature which no other being can acquire. 

 He alone can think of or make the abstract idea of Plea- 

 suj^e an actual object of thought. He can remember and 

 estimate the pleasure of eating, as an abstract idea super- 

 added to the recollection of the physical act of eating. 

 He can, in a word, convert the pleasure of eating into an 

 end, instead of eating with the natural motive of nourish- 

 ing the body. He can thus ab7.ise that gift of Nature, 



^ Domesticated animals, like pigs and oxen, are in an abnormal con- 

 dition of life. 



