220 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM 



consciousness. Nor has he made good the distinction 

 between outward and inner self-consciousness." ^ 



" Following Locke, he [Romanes] makes the power 

 of forming abstract ideas to belong only to man. ' There- 

 fore, 1 think,' says Locke, ' beasts compare not their ideas 

 further than some sensible circumstances annexed to the 

 objects themselves. The other power of comparing, 

 which may be observed in man, belonging to general 

 ideas, and useful only in abstract reasonings, we may 

 probably conjecture brutes have not.' But does not the 

 distinction between conscious and self-consciousness begin 

 at an earlier stage? "^ asks Dr. Iverach. 



I would regard Locke to be the more correct, because 

 self-inspection or self-consciousness is a particular instance 

 of the more general property of making an abstraction, in 

 this case, the Ego^ an object of thought.^ 



The two remaining consequences of Man being alone 

 able to entertain abstract ideas are the Consciousness of 

 having the power to choose or "Free Will," and the con- 

 ception of " Immortality ", These will be considered 

 hereafter. 



^Op. cit., p. 170. ^Op, cit., p. 171. 



* I was not aware that Locke had forestalled me ; for I drew this 

 distinction between man and animals in myActonian Prize Essay, £7)o/m- 

 tio)i and Religion, p. 151 (1873), and emphasised it in Christian Beliefs 

 Reconsidered in the Light of Modern Thought, pp. 63 et seq. (18S4). I gave 

 Romanes a copy of this latter work ; and he said he fully agreed with me 

 as to what I had written. He had previously regarded " Speech " as the 

 fundamental dilference ; but animals of the same kind have indubitably 

 some power of communication between them, though it may always con- 

 cern matters of sense. 



I have no intention of entering upon the field of discussion about the 

 connection between mind and "grey matter," or of consciousness and 

 brain. The reader will find the true theories of Materialism, interaction 

 and parallelism well discussed by Mr. Stout, who himself adopts the last 

 as a provisional hypothesis (Manual of Psychology, Introduction, chap, i., 

 p. 3, on " Mind and Body "). 



