238 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM 



tion," which covers the whole crround, however " reason- 

 ably " the process of adaptation be carried out. 



Now the question follows : Suppose we use the 

 word reason, first, for its recognised use by a most ac- 

 complished metaphysician, who deals entirely with ab- 

 stract thought. Secondly, with the concrete applications 

 of man in everyday life ; as well as on the part of the 

 higher animals, who never get beyond such concrete use 

 of it. 



We then pass it on to apparently " reasonable acts " 

 of reflex action and instinct, till at last we find it in 

 the protoplasm of a cell ; for " means " to secure " ends " 

 occur throughout from top to bottom of the living world. 

 Then are we not justified in concluding that the highest 

 form of reason as seen in man, substantiates the belief 

 that an even higher Mind than his is behind the whole 

 series ; that this Logos or " Directivity " proves by inductive 

 evidence a conscious reason in the recognised Power be- 

 hind Nature ? 



This conclusion Rationalists may not regard as scien- 

 tific, but it is philosophical. 



There is a type of reasoning which is called " common- 

 sense," to which I have just alluded. This appears to be 

 " reasoning about very obvious matters and experiences ". 



An example is the best way of illustrating this ; as it 

 is simply a generalisation from experiences. 



Suppose it has been showery in April all the morn- 

 ing but clears up about noon, and the sun breaks out. A 

 man and his young son go out for a walk. The father 

 puts on his greatcoat and takes his umbrella. 



The son seeing the sun shining docs neither. Another 

 shower comes up in an hour. The father says : " Why 

 didn't you put on your coat and bring an umbrella ? You 

 might have known (or ' your common-sense ' might have 



