RATIONALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY 243 



Mr. Reid compares the three processes as follows : " It 

 is to be noted that instinctive action is as sharply divided 

 from reflex action by the fact that it results from con- 

 sciousness, as it is divided from rational action by the fact 

 that it is due to inborn not acquired knowledge and ways 

 of thinking and acting." ^ 



If he means " not acquired " by the individual itself, 

 he may be right, though prolonged habit may become 

 instinctive in animals, as it does automatic in man ; but 

 from the cases given, instincts seem certainly in some 

 cases to be hereditary reasonable acts, but done auto- 

 matically, the adaptation of means to ends being lost or 

 grotesquely imitated. Thus a tame beaver kept indoors 

 is said to have made a " dam " in the corner of a room by 

 collecting all the small articles it could get, such as 

 brushes, sticks, etc. This seems to be a case of " instinct 

 at fault ". 



Some writers say " instinct never fails," but this is 

 incorrect ; for example, I have found the solid spine of 

 an echinoderm pierced by the boring of some carnivorous 

 univalve. Woodpeckers have injured telegraph poles. 



Again one instinct may clash with another. Thus 

 swallows which had built and hatched eggs too late in the 

 season, abandoned the brood when the instinct to migrate 

 was present. 



A great deal has been written on Instinct in animals ; 

 the majority of cases (if not all) seem to be hereditary 

 habits originally acquired by use and adaptation to the 

 surroundings. I think we may regard this principle of 

 Adaptation to the Environment as applicable to the origin 

 of habits as well as structures, as explaining at least most 

 of them. Thus various kinds of birds always build pre- 



1 Op. cit., p. 147. 



