CHAPTER VI 



FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 



It will now be as well to say a few more words on Voli- 

 tion, or Free Will as it has been called, for some mis- 

 understanding appears in the writings of Rationalists. 

 They deny it altogether, because they say it is regarded 

 as being " free " from all " motives " and " circumstances ". 



If such be thought to be the condition of Free Will, 

 nothing is more absurd. 



The will cannot be in evidence at all, unless some 

 circumstances call forth its exercise. There must be, at 

 least, two courses of action, or the possibility of doing or 

 abstaining from doing something. Moreover, there must 

 be some motive for one or the other course of action. 

 A man's will is only " free," in my estimation, in that 

 his volitional actions are not automatic. 



A dog may have two objects before it, say a plate of 

 meat and to go for a run with its owner. It automatic- 

 ally leaves the plate and obeys the whistle, solely because 

 the latter acts automatically upon him as the more 

 powerful stimulus at the moment. 



Another dog will run after a fowl and kill it if it can 

 catch it ; all the whistling in the world may not stop it ; 

 for the fowl is a greater attraction than the whistle. 



But suppose a man has a chance of making money by 

 cheating another under certain circumstances. He is 

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