278 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM 



that he alone can, so to say, look in upon himself, make 

 each trait of his character an object of thought and dis- 

 cuss with himself their effects as being good or bad, as 

 he is conscious of their relative powers and effects. He 

 then regulates their automatic action by volition. 



This consciousness may have a definite tract to itself — but 

 it is not known where — and when that section is abnormal 

 or diseased, the man becomes an automaton like an 

 animal, his volition or will being arrested. 



In health, however, it is the will which controls the 

 automatism of the brain and makes him a moral being. 



Huxley was the great champion for automatism in 

 man ; and no one can deny that he brought a formidable 

 array of argument to prove that he is — but not entirely 

 — an automaton. 



Huxley argued on the grounds of human and com- 

 parative physiology, from his evolutionary history and 

 from the remarkable case of a French sergeant who had 

 been shot in the head and recovered. In his normal 

 state he was perfectly sane and a moral man ; but he 

 had fits of abnormality when he would make cigarettes 

 of shavings, etc., and steal everything he could lay his 

 hands upon. 



Now, the immediate inference from this case is that 

 men are not altogether automata, if they only become 

 such when suffering from brain lesions, when volition is 

 wanting or is in abeyance ; as in the case of the criminal 

 here mentioned ; for the following is a good illustration 

 of the difference between Automatism and Free Will. It 

 was presented to the judge trying a man for snatching a 

 scarf pin from an carl. 



The prisoner handed in the following extraordinary 

 document : " My Lord, — Before passing sentence, I think 

 it but justice to myself that I should honestly and sin- 



