28o PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM 



of their position. It seems based upon the idea of the 

 inevitable actions of natural law and the obvious auto- 

 matism in the greater part of man's behaviour. 



But no one will deny that man is answerable to law 

 for his actions, vis., civil laws of his country and the 

 moral laws of religion. If he break the former he is 

 guilty and is punished by the Court. If he break the 

 latter he sins and has to answer to his God. 



Now, insane people often do those things which in a 

 sane man would make him guilty or a sinner. We do 

 not recognise them to be so. Similarly, animals often 

 do what look like guilty acts ; as when a horse viciously 

 kicks his master and lames or kills him ; or a dog which 

 bites a man. We may muzzle it, but we do not punish 

 it. 



It is, therefore, quite clear, and the reader could easily 

 multiply similar cases, that our universal practice is to 

 regard animals much in the same light as the insane, so 

 far at least as that " they are not responsible for their 

 actions ". What do we mean by that expression ? 



What is that something which is equally wanting 

 in the insane man and in animals ? We never consider 

 a horse or a dog to be a morally responsible being. 

 Why has common consent established this distinction in 

 practice in the treatment of the insane and animals alike ? 

 The underlying cause of the difference is the wmit of 

 a consciousness of volition. 



The term " Free " seems to have misled some writers. 

 They regard it, I repeat, as meaning " free from motives " 

 and " free from circumstances ". Thus the writer referred 

 to says : " The most ardent advocate of Free Will would 

 be annoyed if he were told that his choice was undeter- 

 mined by reasons and motives. ... A man's choice is 

 wholly determined by circumstances and motives, over 



