282 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM 



hesitates. Herein steps in a new element that is the 

 conscioiiS7iess of choice. And abstract reasoning deters 

 him. 



A Determinist would say that he was just as much 

 restrained automatically as when he rang the bell auto- 

 matically. It is perfectly true that he had a motive for 

 not ringing the bell ; and that motive was based on 

 circumstances ; but his attention was awakened, and he 

 would be perfectly conscious of the choice before him. 

 And that is all, as I understand it, that is meant by 

 Free Will. 



I will now make some quotations from Mr. Mallock's 

 Religion as a Credible Doctrine^ wherein he states the 

 case of the Determinist, and see where he appears to me 

 to be wrong. 



" The act of will, as known to us by our own experi- 

 ence, is an act which invariably is determined by the 

 strongest motive ; and motive, again, is determined by 

 two things — the talents and temperament with which an 

 individual is endowed at his birth, and the circumstances 

 by which, from his birth onward, he is surrounded." ^ 



He would thus reduce Volition to Automatism ; but 

 the reader will have seen that an act is precisely the 

 same whether it be done unconsciously or done with 

 attention frnd co?isciously, as in pulling the bell-rope. 



In the latter case Will or Volition is present ; in the 

 former it is in abeyance. As soon as Attention and 

 Consciousness of the power to choose come into the 

 mind. Volition decides the act. 



The story of the ass placed between two bundles of 

 hay and starving because both were equally tempting is 

 grotesque, but theoretically true — for an ass ; because it 



^ P. go. 



