286 PRESENT-DAY RATIONALISM 



" Free Will " ; and Mr. Mallock in combating it falls into 

 the error of supposing " freedom " means " irrespective 

 of circumstances ". 



It is here where, as it seems to me, lies the funda- 

 mental error ; namely, in assuming that because the word 

 " free " is attached to " will," that it must mean " free from 

 motives and independent of circumstances ". 



It is only by the circumstances that the attention is 

 aroused. Then follows the consciousness of the power to 

 choose and the mind enters upon a train of abstract 

 reasoning about motives, etc., which finally settle the 

 question of Volition. 



Mr. Mallock may well ask : " How is it possible that 

 the desire which we call resolve can arise independently 

 of the circumstances ? " 



I should not make " resolve " a synonym for " desire," 

 but the final result of a mental procedure of which 

 "desire" was the first term. For we may put the two 

 alternatives thus. Some circumstance occurs which 

 raises a desire. We may follow it blindly, i.e., auto- 

 matically, without making any resolve at all. 



Or, we may reflect upon the consequences of pur- 

 suing that desire and then make a resolve not to 

 follow it up. In that case it has passed under the 

 Volition. 



Is not the Determinist, then, misled by the term 

 "Free"? Whoever first suggested it, could not have 

 thoroughly grasped the real conditions of the "will ". I 

 repeat that the very same act may be done, on the one 

 hand, automatically ; or, on the other, with the attention 

 and conscious intention. In the first case Volition is in 

 abeyance, in the second it is present. 



There are thus two very distinct conditions ; and 

 the Determinist has no right to confuse them as one. 



