FREE WILL AND AUTOMATISM 291 



himself, or else to give vent to his passions ; and ^/^ai 

 makes just all the difference between Volition and 

 Automatism ; between morality and immorality in man 

 and the non-morality of an animal. 



The difficulty in which a Determinist is landed by 

 trying to reconcile moral responsibility with automatic 

 response to influences is well seen in Huxley's conten- 

 tion : — 



" A man's moral responsibility for his acts has nothing 

 to do with the causation of these acts, but depends on 

 the frame of mind which accompanies them ". Mr. 

 Forester, who quotes this, well observes that " the ' frame 

 of mind ' is, like other things, the effect of antecedent 

 causes ; and how is it alleged that one is morally re- 

 sponsible for such causes or their effects ? " 



It is sometimes asserted by Determinists in proof of 

 his complete automatism, and that the will is not really 

 " free," if one knew a man's character, one could foretell 

 what his actions would be under every circumstance. 



This is only partially true. Take, for example, ex- 

 treme cases. It is perfectly certain that a habitual 

 drunkard will drink a glass of spirits if offered to him. 

 It is equally certain that a thoroughly honest man will 

 not take a bribe. But with nine-tenths of mankind, it is 

 quite uncertain how a man will behave under certain 

 previously untried circumstances ; and it is not until the 

 critical moment arises, that the very question of Free Will 

 may come in at all (see below, p. 323). 



Determinists argue as if man was altogether auto- 

 matic. Nine-tenths of his daily routine may be ; but 

 there is the fact of our not being able to foresee which of 

 two choices — both equally moral or non-moral, both 

 equally useful or equally anything else, as far as an out- 

 sider could judge — the man will decide upon ; inasmuch 



