20 NATUilAL TIIEOLO&Y. 



CHAPTER III. 



APPLICATION OF THE ARGUMENT. 



This is atheism ; for every indication of contrivance, 

 every manifestation of design which existed in the watch, 

 exists in the works of nature, with the difference on the 

 side of nature of being greater and more, and that in a de 

 gree which exceeds all computation. I mean, that the con 

 trivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the 

 complexity, subtilty, and curiosity of the mechanism ; and 

 still more, if possible, do they go beyond them in number 

 and variety ; yet, in a multitude of cases, are not less evi- 

 dently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less 

 evidently accommodated to their end or suited to their office, 

 than are the most perfect productions of human ingenuity. 



I know no better method of introducing so large a sub- 

 ject, than that of comparing a single thmg with a single 

 tiling : an eye, for example, with a telescope. As far as the 

 examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the 

 same proof that the eye was made for vision, as there is that 

 the telescope was made for assisting it. They are made 

 upon the same principles ; both being adjusted to the laws 

 by which the transmission and refraction of rays of light are 

 regulated. I speak not of the origin of the laws themselves ; 

 but such laws being fixed, the construction in both cases is 

 adapted to them. For instance, these laws require, in order 

 to produce the same effect, that the rays of light, in passing 

 from water into the eye, should be refracted by a more con- 

 vex surface than when it passes out of air into the eye. Ac- 

 cordingly we find that the eye of a fish, in that part of it 

 called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of 

 terrestrial animals. What plainer manifestation of design can 

 there be than this difference ? What could a mathematical 

 instrument maker have done more to show his knowledge of 

 bis principle, his application of that knowledge, his suiting 



