52 NATURAL THEOLOaY. 



bodies, and to the argument deduced from them in proof of 

 design and of a designing Creator, this turn is sometimes 

 attempted to be given, namely, that the parts were not in- 

 tended for the use, but that the use arose out of the parts. 

 This distinction is intelhgible. A cabinet-maker rubs his 

 mahogany with fish-skin ; yet it would be too much to assert 

 that the skin of the dog-fish was made rough and granulat- 

 ed on purpose for the polishing of wood, and the use of cab- 

 inet-makers. Therefore the distinction is intelligible. But 

 I think that there is very little place for it in the works of 

 nature. When roundly and generally affirmed of them, as 

 it hath sometimes been, it amounts to such another stretch 

 of assertion as it would be to say, that all the implements 

 of the cabinet-maker's workshop, as well as his fish-skin, 

 were substances accidentally configurated, which he had 

 picked up and converted to his use ; that his adzes, saws, 

 planes, and gimlets, were not made, as we suppose, to hew, 

 cut, smooth, shape out, or bore wood with, but that, these 

 tilings being made, no matter with what design, or whether 

 with any, the cabinet-maker perceived that they were appli- 

 cable to his purpose, and turned them to account. 



But, again, so far as this solution is attempted to be 

 ipplied to those parts of animals the action of which does 

 -!ot depend upon the will of the animal, it is fraught with 

 still more evident absurdity. Is it possible to believe that 

 the eye was formed without any regard to vision ; that it 

 was the animal itself which found out that, though formed 

 with no such intention, it would serve to see with ; and that 

 the use of the eye as an organ of sight resulted from this 

 discovery, and the animal's application of it ? The same 

 question may be asked of the ear ; the same of all the senses 

 None of the senses fundamentally depend upon the election 

 jf the animal ; consequently neither upon his sagacity nor 

 his experience. It is the impression which objects make 

 upon them that constitutes their use. Under that impres 

 sion he is passive. He may bring objects to the sense, 07 



