TERSONAJ.ITY OF DEITY. 271 



So, then, the watch iu motion establishes to the observer 

 two conclusions : one, that thought, contrivance, and design 

 liave been employed in the forming, proportioning, and ar- 

 ranging of its parts ; and that wlioever or wherever he be, 

 or were, such a contriver there is, or was ; the other, that 

 force or power, distinct from mechanism, is at this present 

 time acting upon it. If I saw a hand-mill even at rest, J 

 should see contrivance ; but if I saw it grinding, I should 

 be assured that a hand was at the windlass, though in an- 

 other room. It is the same in nature. In the works of na- 

 ture we trace mechanism, and this alone proves contriv- 

 ance ; but living, active, moving, productive nature proves 

 also the exertion of a power at the centre ; for wherever 

 the power resides may be tlenominated the centre. 



The intervention and disposition of what are called 

 .^' S€CO?icl causes,'' fall under the same observation. This 

 disposition is or is not mechanism, according as we can or 

 can not trace it by our senses and means of examination. 

 That is all the difference there is ; and it is a difference 

 which respects our faculties, not the things themselves. 

 Now, where the order of second causes is mechanical, what 

 is here said of mechanism strictly applies to it. But it would 

 be always mechanism — natural chemistry, for instance, 

 would be mechanism — if our senses were acute enough to 

 descry it. Neither mechanism, therefore, in the works of 

 nature, nor the intervention of what are called second caus- 

 es — for I think that they are the same thing — excuses the 

 ne;*.essity of an agent distinct from both. 



If, in tracing these causes, it be said that we find certain 

 general properties of matter which have nothing in them 

 that bespeaks intelligence, I answer, that still the managing 

 oi these properties, the pointing and directing them to the 

 uses wdiich we see made of them, demands intelligence in 

 the highest degree. For example, suppose animal secre- 

 tions to be elective attractions, and that such and such at- 

 tractions universallv belonsf to such and such substances — 



