THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS 33 



tinue to use the term in the old way. This procedure enabled me 

 to discuss perception, memory and kindred topics so that the 

 statements were made true, whether the reader accepted my view 

 or adhered to the older one: a result which, at that time, it was 

 desirable to obtain. 



It is now time to make a full break with the conventional 

 theory of imagery, and to state the empirical doctrine above 

 mentioned in the most positive and unequivocal way possible. 

 This course is rendered advisable by the fact that some of the 

 critical readers of my text-book were puzzled by what appeared 

 to them vacillation in the treatment of imagination, and is ren- 

 dered imperative by the recent developments in what is called 

 " behaviorism," in which the rejection of imagery is coupled with 

 an extreme development of empirical thought-analysis which 

 makes my system seem now quite conservative. I am obliged 

 to protest against the behaviorist doctrine of thought since I feel 

 that the more conservative innovation may suffer from the op- 

 position which will be called out by the extreme doctrine. 



We must distinguish more carefully than has heretofore been 

 customary, between " consciousness" and " content." " Con- 

 sciousness" is awareness of anything whatever, and " content" is 

 the anything of which one is conscious or aware. The distinction 

 is perfectly clear but heretofore psychology has avoided it. 

 " Sensation," for example, has been used convertibly for both an 

 elementary quality of content and for the awareness of that 

 quality. So with the other " elementary forms of consciousness" 

 affective and conative factors: one is rarely certain whether 

 an author means actually consciousness, or content, when he 

 refers to them. 



This distinction between consciousness and content must be 

 kept in mind throughout this discussion, or else much of it will be 

 misunderstood. The term sensation, in particular, is always to 

 be taken as indicating a perceived (or perceptible) factor, and 

 never the perceiving thereof. When I speak of " muscular sen- 

 sation" I mean the peculiar aspect of the actual muscle-contrac- 

 tion which is perceived by the owner of the muscle, and by him 

 alone. The contraction has visible aspects, and tangible aspects, 



PBTCHOBIOLOQT, VOL. II, NO. 1 



