34 KNIGHT DUNLAP 



which may be perceived by several people : in addition it has this 

 "kinaesthetic" aspect which can be perceived by one person 

 only. 



An image, as understood in current psychology, is a form of 

 sensory content, though not exactly a sensation. Just how it is 

 supposed to differ from a sensation is not at the present moment 

 an important consideration, since there is a variety of opinion on 

 the point. The fundamental likeness of image to sensation con- 

 sists in the image having the modality of the sensation from 

 which it is derived. Some images, accordingly, are visual, some 

 are auditory, some are gustatory, and so on. This modality of 

 images is usually understood as being the fact that the images, 

 in themselves, differ qualitatively in the same way in which sen- 

 sations differ. For example, the fundamental difference between 

 visual images and auditory images is of the same order as the 

 difference between visual and auditory sensation. An "idea" is 

 commonly defined as "an image with its meaning." I may, it 

 is supposed, have an "image" of a dark brown rectangle with a 

 gold design on it; but that image has no more value in thought 

 than the stars I see when I bump my head against the steampipe 

 in the basement, unless I have also the consciousness that the 

 colored rectangle stands for, or refers to, a copy of Hobbes's 

 Leviathan lying on my table, or some such object other than the 

 image itself. 



Of what use, we might ask is the image? What is its function 

 in the process of ideation? Since, in addition to being conscious 

 of the image, I must also be conscious of the object to which it 

 refers, should I not get on just as well if I were conscious of the 

 object alone? Or rather, should I not get along better, since I 

 should then have but one thing to deal with instead of two? 

 From the point of view of the conventional doctrine of images, 

 the only possible answer is that as a matter of fact the image does 

 appear when one thinks of the object, and therefore that it must 

 have some function. It seems fair to assume that the doctrine 

 of images would never have been developed in its elaborate form, 

 nor have been so tenaciously held, if there were not actually 

 some present content inseparably associated with the thought 



