THE EVOLUTION OF MORAL CODES 89 



actual resort to arms. The method of distributing 

 justice to-day in some of our most enlightened 

 nations, as shown by the Dreyfus case, bears mani- 

 fest evidence of such a desire to keep the peace rather 

 than to determine the justice of the case. 



Law was thus established as a means of regulating 

 pajTuent for injuries. The only justice recognized 

 was that each should be held responsible for the 

 result of his actions, wholly irrespective of his 

 motives. This is exactly the kind of justice that 

 nature measures out to the individual. The inex- 

 orable laws of nature pay not the slightest atten- 

 tion to motive. The man whose leg is broken try- 

 ing to save the life of a friend suffers exactly as 

 much as if it had been broken in trying to take his 

 life. Motive and justice play no part in nature's 

 laws. 



It was natural enough, therefore, that the artificial 

 law developed by mankind should have a similar 

 aspect. But as society developed new notions en- 

 tered into the conception of law. Louis XII of 

 France improved the conditions of things by intro- 

 ducing into the courts the force of reason as a substi- 

 tute for the force of arms; but he made no special 

 attempt to make them courts of justice as we under- 

 stand the term. More recently attention has been 

 turned from the act to the motive. Justice, as we 

 understand it to-day, insists that in the administra- 

 tion of our artificial laws each shall, so far as pos- 

 sible, be rewarded according to his motives and not 

 simply his acts. This is quite a new idea in the his- 

 tory of the administration of law and we are still far 

 from realizing it to perfection. We frequently say 

 that our courts are travesties of justice. The ability 



