104 SOCIAL HEREDITY AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION 



sympathy, nor all these together, constitute a moral 

 sense, even though they may have been the founda- 

 tion emotions upon which it was built. In some way 

 and at some time there was taken a new step which 

 led eventually to the sense of duty and the idea of 

 right and wrong. Of course we can, from the nature 

 of the case, have no direct evidence as to when or 

 how this new conception first made its appearance 

 in the early history of mankind. We can only study 

 how it develops in the child and make certain deduc- 

 tions from this and other data which may lead us to 

 a fairly clear-cut theory upon the subject. The dis- 

 cussion as to the origin of this moral sense or con- 

 science has long been a favorite one for philosophy, 

 theolog>% and science as well, and it is hardly pos- 

 sible to add much to the discussion. But in the light 

 of our general subject certain aspects of the discus- 

 sion need restatement and reapplication. 



We can best present the phase of the matter which 

 bears upon our subject by first trying to analyze the 

 method by which the idea of right and wrong arises 

 in the growing child. At the beginning of a child *s 

 life he is, of course, without any moral attributes. 

 He does not even have sense enough to obey any- 

 thing, simply trying to gain the satisfaction of his 

 desires. As his mind begins to develop he early 

 learns to obey his parents. The impulses that urge 

 him to this are clearly twofold. He is partly influ- 

 enced by fear of punishment or the displeasure of 

 his parents and partly by a love for them and a de- 

 sire to please. Clearly enough, in the very young 

 child no idea of right or wrong exists. The very 

 methods adopted by the parents to teach obedience 

 prove this. Sometimes the fear of punishment is 



