THE EVOLUTION OF THE MORAL SENSE 113 



come to recognize two classes of action, one which 

 he is impelled to perform, and another from which 

 he is to refrain. It makes no difference whether 

 the impelling force was at first fear or love, whether 

 it was from within or without, the two classes are 

 distinct. Recognizing the two classes, he inevit- 

 ably names them and thus forms the abstraction 

 of right and wrong. The content of right and wrong 

 concerns moral codes, but the recognition of these 

 ideas, together with their authority, constitutes the 

 moral sense. From this time these two notions 

 more or less dominate life. Man feels himself 

 bound to do right, and wrong is repellent to him. 

 He seldon tries to analyze the reason why he should 

 do right, any more than a child reasons why he 

 should obey his mother. He simply feels that some- 

 thing within him impels him toward one line of 

 action and repels him from another. The right 

 action then becomes the reason for its own exist- 

 ence. Eight conduct appears before him as the 

 action of the ideal, and his knight is the man who, 

 under all conditions, follows this line which he calls 

 right. The relation is now reversed. The supposed 

 actions of his ideal gave him his first notion of right ; 

 but now the right has been abstracted from his ideal, 

 and this ideal becomes henceforth the person who, 

 under all circumstances, does the right. Right action 

 has become an end in itself. The highest stage of the 

 moral sense has been reached. 



When this stage is reached the individual may fre- 

 quently go far in advance of the average of the race. 

 That which is customary may no longer appear to 

 be right to him. He has a classification of actions, 

 and into one of two classes he places every act. 



