204 SOCIAL HEREDITY AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION 



attributes. But this does not answer our question, 

 for there are two very distinct classes of mental attri- 

 butes. These two classes we are accustomed to call 

 the intellectual and the instinctive. Although both 

 of these classes of actions are fundamental!}'- mental, 

 the more they are studied the more sharply do they 

 stand in contrast with each other. The one leads to 

 actions on the part of the individual, with a definite 

 purpose in mind. When man acts from intelligence 

 he recognizes the end he has in view, recognizes the 

 relation of the means to that end, and directs his 

 action from the beginning with the distinct purpose 

 of accomplishing definite results. Intellect acts 

 slowly, and comes into force little by little as the 

 man learns by education and experience. This is a 

 distinctive attribute of man, although perhaps he 

 shares it with the higher animals to a slight extent. 

 But the instinctive nature is widely different. An 

 instinctive act is the result of impulse and not argu- 

 ment. Most prominent among these instinctive acts, 

 for our purpose, stands the ethical nature. By this 

 it is not meant to imply that the moral sense is simply 

 an instinct, but only that its acts are of the nature of 

 impulse rather than reason. When man acts in ac- 

 cordance with his moral sense he acts without debate, 

 and follows what we are in the habit of calling 

 impulse. This does not mean that his conscience acts 

 without reason, but simply that the force that impels 

 him to do right is instinctive and not logical. He 

 feels that he must follow certain lines of action 

 because they are right, and this feeling impels hun 

 to act, wholly independent of arguments which may 

 be brought up as to the results of his action. Nay, 

 more ; this impulse rules him against his own argu- 



