30 



lectual sphere discussed in chapters two and three. From the 

 standpoint of natural history, then, Darwin proceeds to 

 examine the ethical problem. 



"The following proposition seems to me, in a high degree 

 probable, namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with 

 well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections 

 being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense 

 or conscience as soon as its intellectual powers had become 

 as well, or nearly as well developed as in man." 1 



Now what Darwin means by instinct, although not always 

 clear, seems fundamentally to be based upon some modifica- 

 tion of the physical organism, in particular the brain and 

 nervous system, under the control of Natural Selection, such 

 modification being "gained, step by step through the varia- 

 bility of the mental organs and Natural Selection, without 

 any conscious intelligence on the part of the animal during 

 each successive generation." 2 Darwin confirms this view of 

 instinct elsewhere, by stating that "the very essence of an 

 instinct is that it is followed independently of reason." 3 



Darwin's use of the terms 'conscious intelligence' and 

 'reason' in this connection, does not appear to imply that 

 instinct is without consciousness. Although his explanation 

 of the term is generally in the negative sense just indicated, 

 i.e., maintaining that instinct is not characterized by the 

 higher functions of human consciousness, for example, reason, 

 yet it would seem that consciousness of some kind is under- 

 stood in connection with instinct. An analogous type of con- 

 sciousness to that which Darwin most probably implies in 

 the case of instinct may be seen if one recalls the historical 

 meaning of the term 'moral sense', which Darwin uses so 

 frequently. As this doctrine was set forth by Hutcheson, man 

 has a 'sense' which informs him of the Tightness or wrongness 

 of conduct in much the same way as the visual sense makes 

 him aware of colours. There is no comparative activity im- 

 plied in such a consciousness, merely a direct awareness. 

 The fact that Darwin excludes intelligence and reason from 

 his definition of instinct, evidently bears out this exposition 

 of his use of such a term. 



We may see the significance of this 'moral sense' theory 

 in the following extract from a criticism of Hutcheson's position 

 by Richard Price: "In other words, our ideas of morality, if 

 this account is right, have the same origin with our ideas of the 



M^.C. pp. 71-2. 

 'O.C. p. 39. 

 3 O.C. p. 100. 



