31 



sensible qualities of bodies, the harmony of sounds, or the 

 beauties of painting or sculpture; that is, the mere good plea- 

 sure of our Maker adapting the mind and its organs in a 

 particular manner to certain objects, * * *. Moral right and 

 wrong * * are particular modifications of our minds, or im- 

 pressions which they are made to receive from the contem- 

 plation of certain actions, which the contrary actions might 

 have occasioned, had the Author of nature so pleased; * * V 1 



The so-to-say accidental character of right and wrong in 

 the foregoing is paralleled by Darwin's account of the means 

 by which one desire rather than another is followed. "Why 

 should a man feel that he ought to obey one instinctive desire 

 rather than another?" 2 Darwin asks. The answer is that 

 "the more enduring Social Instincts conquer the less Per- 

 sistent Instincts." 3 So far it is merely a battle of instincts, but 

 Darwin now says that "Man, from the activity of his mental 

 faculties, cannot avoid reflection ; past impressions and images 

 are incessantly passing through his mind with distinctness." 4 

 "Thus, as man cannot prevent old impressions continually 

 repassing through his mind, he will be compelled to compare 

 the weaker impressions of, for instance, past hunger, or of 

 vengeance satisfied or danger avoided at the cost of other men, 

 with the instinct of sympathy and goodwill of his fellows, 

 which is still present, and ever in some degree active in his 

 mind." 5 There is now, therefore, more than the conquering 

 of one set of instincts by another set; there is the activity of 

 man's mental faculties judging and comparing the instincts; 

 such comparison being other than instinctive, namely, re- 

 flective. That is, in the process of evolution there arises the 

 power to compare the present with the past, and to profit by 

 experience. But the force of this seems to be somewhat 

 weakened by a further statement that "Thus, at last, man 

 comes to feel, through acquired, and perhaps through in- 

 herited habit, that it is best for him to obey his more persistent 

 impulses." 6 



Nevertheless, it is difficult to get from Darwin a consistent 

 view as to the origin of morality. As is evident in the above 

 quotations, Darwin seems to be unable to give any definite 

 account of instinct without introducing peculiarly mental 



Richard Price, quoted from text as in Selby-Bigge "British Moralists", 

 pp. 106-7. 

 2 O.C. p. 87. 

 3 O.C. p. 89. 



'O.C. p. 90. 

 "O.C. p. 92. 



