40 



we have found true of the Associationist, may perhaps be 

 doubted, but from the great amount of time and space which 

 he devotes to expounding all the intricacies of the nervous 

 system, and the relation which these are said to bear to 

 mental facts, it is extremely difficult to reach any other con- 

 clusion. For Association Psychology has always taken for 

 granted, either explicitly or implicitly, an independent world 

 from which consciousness is derived. This is particularly so in 

 the physiological aspect which is supposed to supply an im- 

 mediate foundation upon which to base a psychology. Spencer, 

 in this respect, appears to be no exception to the rule of the 

 Associationists, but he proceeds to deal with the problem of 

 the external world as the manifestation of the 'Unknowable'. 

 His position will be evident from the following quotations. 



"To speak specifically," he says, "it has been shown that 

 though we can never learn the nature of that which is mani- 

 fested to us, we are daily learning more completely the order 

 of its manifestations. We are conscious of effects produced in 

 us by something separate from ourselves. The facts of which 

 we are conscious the changes of consciousness which make 

 up our mental life, we ascribe to the forces of an external world. 

 The intrinsic character of these forces of this external world 

 of that which underlies all appearances, we find inscrutable; 

 as is also the internal something whose changes constitute 

 consciousness. But at the same time we find among the 

 changes of consciousness thus produced, there exist various 

 constant relations; and we have no choice but to ascribe con- 

 stancy to the relations which subsist among the inscrutable 

 causes of these changes." 1 But Spencer is not satisfied with 

 the mere inscrutability of the external world, for he advances to 

 a proof of the existence of such a world. "The facts of con- 

 sciousness, supposed to be interpretable only on the Kantian 

 hypothesis, are interpretable on the experience hypothesis 

 when it is adequately expounded. If in pursuance of the 

 doctrine of evolution, we suppose modifications produced by 

 experience to be inheritable, it must happen that if there 

 are any universal forms of the non-ego, these must establish 

 corresponding universal forms in the ego. These forms, being 

 embodied in the organization, will impress themselves on the 

 first intuitions of the individual; and will thus appear to ante- 

 cede all experience." 2 This quotation states clearly Spencer's 

 position in relation to Association psychology, on the one hand, 

 and to the Evolution theory which gave it so extensive support, 



l " First Principles", 35. 

 '"Principles of Psychology", 399. 



