42 



remains fixed in the midst of changing appearances. And this 

 conception, uniting independence, and force, and permanence, 

 is the conception we have of matter." 1 



(3) Relation between Nervous System and Mental States. 



Passing from Spencer's treatment of external 'matter', 

 we may now consider his treatment of the relation said to 

 exist between the nervous system and the mental states. 



In the early pages of his ' Principles of Psychology ', Spencer 

 makes his standpoint clear in connection with this matter. 

 He says: "We are primarily concerned with psychological 

 phenomena as phenomena of evolution, and, under their 

 objective aspect, these, reduced to their lowest terms, are inci- 

 dents in the continuous redistribution of matter and motion." 2 

 As already indicated, Spencer introduces his psychology by 

 an analysis of the nervous system. "The nervous system is 

 the initiator of motion." 3 "Nervous stimulations and dis- 

 charges consist of waves of molecular change that chase one 

 another rapidly through nerve-fibres." 4 After a very minute 

 exposition of the development of the nervous system, Spencer 

 states: "Throughout the foregoing argument, functions when 

 referred to, have been expressed in physiological language. 

 It remains to translate these into psychological language. 

 What have been considered as increasingly complex nervous 

 actions, we have now to consider as increasingly complex 

 mental states." 5 Returning to an earlier part of the work a 

 similar 'translation' is found. Spencer there says: "In the 

 last chapter, 6 we saw that what is objectively a wave of molec- 

 ular change propagated through a nerve centre, is subjec- 

 tively a unit of feeling, akin in nature to what we call a nervous 

 shock. In one case we found a conclusive proof that when a 

 rapid succession of such waves yields a rapid succession of 

 such units of feeling, there results the continuous feeling 

 known as a sensation; and that the quality of the feeling 

 changes when these waves and corresponding units of feeling 

 recur with a different rapidity. Further, it was shown that 

 by unions among simultaneous series of such units recurring 



K).C. 468. 



*O.C. 7. 



3 O.C. 4. 



<O.C. 40. 



*O.C. 243. This, of course, is one of Mr. Spencer's numerous incon- 

 sistencies, since he has already said that mental states cannot be conceived 

 as forms of matter and motion, and do not therefore necessarily conform to 

 the same laws of redistribution. 



'That is, Ch. I of Pt. II "Substance of Mind". 



