47 



of the nervous system and certain resulting necessities of 

 thought; and the a priori beliefs determined by these necessi- 

 ties differ from a posteriori beliefs simply in this, that they are 

 products of the experiences of innumerable successive indi- 

 viduals instead of the experiences of a single individual." The 

 bearing of this latter quotation on ethics is apparent in the 

 sequel: "If then, from the evolution point of view, this is 

 undoubtedly so with these simple cognitions which concern 

 space, time and number, must we not infer that it is so in large 

 measure with those more complex cognitions which concern 

 human relations?" that is, ethical intuitions. 



(4) Problems of the Ego, and the Will. 



All this is ample evidence that, according to Spencer, the 

 aim is to explain psychological phenomena by physiological 

 processes. The significance of this relation between these two 

 series of phenomena becomes manifest when Spencer discusses 

 the Ego, and its closely related problem of Freedom. Not 

 only are nervous states responsible for psychical states, but the 

 whole physical organism is the real factor in what is commonly 

 known as the Ego. 



As we have seen, by an evolution from the physiological, 

 the stage of reflex action is reached. 1 From thence develop 

 instinct, memory, reason. 2 "Memory, reason and feeling 

 simultaneously arise as the automatic actions become com- 

 plex, infrequent, and hesitating; and will, arising at the same 

 time, is necessitated by the same conditions." 3 On the ques- 

 tion of the freedom of the will, which has thus arisen, Spencer 

 speaks as follows: "That every one is at liberty to do what he 

 desires to do (supposing there are no external hindrances) all 

 admit. * * * But that every one is at liberty to desire or not to 

 desire, which is the real proposition involved in the dogma of 

 free will, is negatived as much by the analysis of consciousness 

 as by the contents of the preceding chapters." 4 "Will is 

 nothing but the general name given to the special feeling that 

 gains supremacy and determines action" 5 which feeling is 

 determined by physiological conditions. 



Such a conclusion is, of course, based on the relation in 

 which each organism is said to stand to its predecessors. This 

 relation is set forth in the following: "Corresponding to 



^O.C. 191. 



*O.C. 194, 199, 203. 



3 O.C. 217. 



*O.C. 219. 



6 O.C. 220. 



