61 



example, I see an orange. That is to say, certain cones of the 

 retina of my eye are stimulated by light waves of a yellow 

 quality, and at the bidding of these stimuli I construct the 

 object, which I call an orange. That object is distant, round- 

 ish, yellow, resisting and yet somewhat soft, with a peculiar 

 smell, and possessed of a taste of its own. * * * But what has 

 led me to construct an object with these qualities? Experi- 

 ence has taught me that these qualities are grouped together 

 in special ways in an orange. I constructed that particular 

 object through what is termed the principle of association. 

 The object is a 'construct'." 1 



Apparently this is not the passive process of physiological 

 association which has been presented by previous writers, 

 and yet if we examine the data of such association, it will be 

 seen that they are derived from the same source, for in speak- 

 ing of sensations only a few pages further on, it is stated that 

 "they all arose in stimulations of the end-organs of special 

 sense. Thence the explosive waves of change passed inwards 

 to the brain and somewhere therein gave rise to mental pro- 

 ducts. These mental products, the accompaniments of nerve- 

 changes, can in no sense be like the outside something which 

 gave rise to them. They are symbols of that outside some- 

 thing. And it is these symbols that we build up into objects." 2 

 "The sensations which thus originate are mental effects, in 

 no sense resembling their causes, but representing them in 

 mental symbolism." 3 Consequently as the progress is from 

 the "outside something" through the "nerves changes", to 

 the "mental products", the accompaniments of such "nerve 

 changes", it would seem that Lloyd Morgan's theory of 

 association is not in the least different from that already 

 considered. 



Following his treatment of the mental processes in man, 

 Morgan deals with the mental processes in animals, their 

 powers of perception and intelligence, their appetences and 

 emotions, habit and instinct. 4 Without going into this side 

 of the question, which is very similar to the treatment given 

 by Romanes, a quotation or two to indicate the standpoint 

 will be sufficient. We may here repeat the statement quoted 

 in our examination of Romanes' position: "If we accept the 

 theory of organic evolution, and accept also the view that 



MD.C. p. 311. 

 2O.C. p. 314. 

 3 O.C. p. 319. 

 4 O.C. Ch. 10. 



