68 



ducts', that is, as Spencer would say. This statement of 

 genetic psychology finds expression in Baldwin's latest work, 

 under the title 'Darwin and the Humanities'. 1 "There are 

 not two evolutions," he says, "one organic, and the other 

 mental, but mind and body have evolved by one process, 

 and in one series of gradual changes; evolution, that is, has 

 been psychophysical." 2 "If mind be natural, and also use- 

 ful, then we are still within the Darwinian circle of ideas. 

 Why are not mental faculties and functions to be considered 

 characters which have been evolved by selection, for their 

 utility?" 3 "Mind is correlated with plasticity; its evolution 

 with that of brain and nerves. The history of the evolution 

 of these organs is also that of the evolution of mind." 4 



VI. GENERAL CRITICISM. 



In the foregoing pages we have sought to set forth what 

 is, in the main, the fundamental standpoint, although variously 

 expressed, of those theories which claim to 'explain ' conscious- 

 ness. This includes a brief exposition of the 'Associationist' 

 psychology prior to the time of Darwin, an outline of Darwin's 

 theory, in so far as it deals with the origin of mental and moral 

 phenomena, and finally, a sketch of the theory of the origin 

 of conscious phenomena as found in the works of Herbert 

 Spencer, Romanes, Lloyd Morgan, and Baldwin. 



The relation between the physiological and psychological 

 processes is assumed to be so intimate that the above writers 

 have, in general, come to the conclusion that all our mental 

 states find their explanation in physiological processes. The 

 question which now confronts us, therefore, is that with which 

 the thesis was introduced, namely, Can the standpoint which 

 aims at accounting for mental phenomena in this way be 

 scientifically maintained? Can it be shown, for example, as 

 Spencer so often asserts, that the visceral and nervous struc- 

 tures, blood supply, etc., account for all that takes place in 

 human nature and action? 



Our criticism of this standpoint will follow, in the main, 

 the exposition which has been given of Herbert Spencer's 

 work, for, as intimated, fundamentally the one standpoint, 

 with minor variations, is common to all the writers. 



The examination of Spencer showed that something other 

 than consciousness is postulated as that from which conscious- 



a j. M. Baldwin, "Darwin and the Humanities", Review Pub. Co., 

 Baltimore, 1909. 

 2 O.C. p. 8. 

 8 O.C. p. 22. 

 'Ibid. 



