69 



ness is to be derived. This is the great problem of the external 

 world, to prove the existence of which Spencer makes an ex- 

 haustive attempt. This problem will later receive some con- 

 sideration, but in the meantime the significance of the doctrine 

 of such an external world may be seen in the way in which 

 Spencer uses it in connection with the problem of the associa- 

 tion of ideas. In concluding his lengthy proof , he states that 

 "the general conception thus formed of an independent source 

 of activity beyond consciousness develops into a more special 

 conception when we examine the particular clusters of vivid 

 states aroused in us. For we find that each cluster, distin- 

 guished by us as an object, is a separate seat of the power with 

 which the objective world as a whole impresses us. We find 

 that while it is this power which gives unity to the cluster, it 

 is also this power which opposes our energies". This power 

 holds together the elements of the cluster "notwithstanding 

 the endlessly- varied changes they undergo in consciousness" 

 and "is therefore thought of by us as persisting, or continuing 

 to exist, in the midst of all those manifestations which do not 

 continue to exist". 1 



In this way Spencer develops the immediately given facts 

 muscular sensations, sensations of resistance, vivid states 

 of pressure into a doctrine of an external world, which has, 

 for him, a profound significance for the phenomena of con- 

 sciousness. Although here Spencer speaks of this power as 

 "thought of by us as persisting", later in the same section he 

 speaks of it definitely as remaining "fixed in the midst of 

 changing appearances", and concludes with the words that 

 "this conception, uniting independence, and force, and per- 

 manence, is the conception we have of matter". 



"Matter", then, is that which possesses "independence", 

 "force", and "permanence". "Matter" it is which con- 

 tinues to exist "in the midst of all those manifestations which 

 do not continue to exist". "Matter" is external to con- 

 sciousness; the "manifestations" are in consciousness. This 

 is the doctrine, and it is this outlook which so completely 

 colours Spencer's whole system of psychology. This is the 

 order of his thought, that is, from the independent, the active, 

 the permanent, to those "manifestations" which are not 

 permanent, and which are dependent and passive because 

 manifestations only. 



It will therefore be evident, according to the Spencerian 

 standpoint, in what relation the science of psychology should 

 stand to the so-called 'external world'. This external world, 



1 See p. 41. 



