71 



that "conscious action gradually arises out of reflex"; that, 

 in fact, consciousness is "but an adjunct" resulting from the 

 occurrence of "ganglionic friction". This relegating of con- 

 sciousness to the position of an epiphenomenon or by-product 

 was illustrated further by reference to the psychological 

 phenomena of choice and purpose, memory, and association 

 of ideas. Romanes maintained in connection with the latter, 

 that "it may be granted that a series of discharges taking 

 place through the same group of nervous arcs will always be 

 attended with the occurrence of the same series of ideas", and 

 "that the tendency of ideas to recur in the same order as that 

 in which they have previously occurred, is merely a psycho- 

 logical expression of the physiological fact that lines of dis- 

 charge become more and more permeable by use". 



Lloyd Morgan asserts the complete distinctness of the phy- 

 siological ajid psychological orders. He speaks of the "im- 

 pressions received by the recipient organs " as being "no longer 

 regarded as mere stimuli but as elements of consciousness", 

 which impressions, he states, are "co-ordinated and organized " 

 and "built up into those sensations and perceptions through 

 which the objects of the external world take origin and shape". 

 It is apparent that the order of Lloyd Morgan's thought 

 is from the physiological to the psychological or better, 

 from the physical to the physiological, from the physiological 

 to the psychological, and from the psychological to the phy- 

 sical. It is significant in this connection that he speaks of 

 the "elements of consciousness" as being "co-ordinated and 

 organized " and "built up into sensations and perceptions" a 

 passive process; whereas, earlier, he treats of the nervous 

 system as an active agency, stating that "we must picture the 

 central nervous system co-ordinating and organizing the 

 stimuli brought into it". Likewise, sensations are produced; 

 they arise in stimulations of the end-organs of special sense, 

 an "outside something" giving rise to them; they are mental 

 effects, in no sense resembling their causes. 



And Baldwin follows in the same strain. "The neuro- 

 logical function already described as the physical basis of 

 memory," he affirms, "will at once suggest the psychological 

 doctrine as well." The physical basis of memory and asso- 

 ciation "is accomplished in the organism by an arrangement 

 whereby a group of processes * * * conspire, so to speak, to ' ring 

 up' one another". Passing over to the psychological side of 

 this process, Baldwin states that "the question on the side of 

 consciousness, as to how different 'copies' get to ring one an- 

 other up, in such a system, is the question of association". 



