87 



appropriate motor changes, and various of the feelings and 

 ideas which must accompany and succeed them; and when, 

 under the stimulus of this composite psychical state, the 

 nascent motor changes pass into actual motor changes; this 

 composite psychical state which excites the action , is at the same 

 time the ego which is said to will the action. Naturally 

 enough, then, the subject of such psychical changes says 

 that he wills the action; since, psychically considered, he is 

 at that moment nothing more than the composite state of 

 consciousness by which the action is excited. But to say 

 that the performance of the action is, therefore, the result of 

 free will, is to say that he determines the cohesions of the 

 psychical states which arouse the action; and as these psy- 

 chical states constitute himself at that moment, this is to say 

 that these psychical states determine their own cohesions, 

 which is absurd. Their cohesions have been determined by 

 experiences the greater part of them, constituting what we 

 call his natural character, by the experiences of antecedent 

 organisms; and the rest by his own experiences. The changes 

 which at each moment take place in his consciousness, and 

 among others those he is said to will, are produced by this 

 infinitude of previous experiences registered in his nervous 

 structure, co-operating with the immediate impressions on 

 his senses: the effects of these combined factors being in every 

 case qualified by the physical state, general or local, of his 

 organism." 1 



And, in concluding, Spencer says: "We speak of Will 

 as something apart from the feeling or feelings which, for the 

 moment, prevail over others; whereas it is nothing but the 

 general name given to the special feeling that gains supremacy 

 and determines action." 2 



In looking over Spencer's argument in connection with the 

 Will, as briefly stated above, it may be seen that such argu- 

 ment is only saved from a complete circle by the sequence in 

 time of the different actions in experience. Obviously, on 

 this theory, actions in the environment cause impressions on 

 the sense organs, and accompanying changes in the organism. 

 These in turn give rise to feelings. The feelings, coupled with 

 the aggregate of other feelings and ideas which fuse with them, 

 again influence the organism and determine action mani- 

 festly through motor changes. 



Now if this "aggregate of feelings and ideas" or "the men- 

 tal self" determine the action, then we cannot say that free 



1U Principles of Psychology" 219. 

 2 O.C. 220. 



