89 



Will is conceived to be, in the last analysis, nothing more 

 than a process of physiological functioning that is, he con- 

 siders the Will to be reduced to a physiological determinism. 



In consonance with the position of physiological deter- 

 minism for which Spencer contends, he states in his * Principles 

 of Ethics': "Acceptance of the doctrine of organic evolution 

 determines certain ethical conceptions" though, to be sure, 

 how ethical conceptions can be obtained clearly and logically 

 from a completely locked and determined system of antecedent 

 and consequent, cause and effect, is at least an interesting 

 enquiry. Again, we are told that circumstances have moulded 

 the organism into fitness for the requirements of life. Through 

 nervous modifications there have been developed psychological 

 phenomena needed "for the appropriate use of the bodily 

 organs". He further states that "we shall assume it to be an 

 inevitable inference from the doctrine of organic evolution 

 that the highest type of living being, no less than of lower 

 types, must go on moulding itself to those requirements which 

 circumstances impose". And, "we shall by implication 

 assume that moral changes are among the changes thus 

 wrought out", that is, are completely determined. In 

 fact, Spencer states in concluding, "there needs but a contin- 

 uance of absolute peace externally, and a rigorous insistence 

 on non-aggression internally, to ensure the moulding of men 

 into a form naturally characterized by all .the virtues", for, 

 he says, "we have to deal with Man as a product of evolu- 

 tion, with Society as a product of evolution, and with Moral 

 Phenomena as products of evolution" 1 though it must be 

 borne in mind that the "absolute peace" and "rigorous in- 

 sistence" are alike inevitable. 



On such a physiological basis, however, there is no pos- 

 sibility of maintaining the position of the responsibility of 

 the individual in the state, and Spencer is thereby precluded 

 from any consistent advocacy of social ethical theory. Where- 

 in, on such a theory, would man differ, morally, from the 

 plant? or from any body or organism determined in toto by 

 mechanical antecedents? And if in no respect, of what value 

 is it to prescribe for him ethical rules? 



The general outcome of this elaboration of a definition of 

 Evolution is that Spencer can only formulate an ethical 

 theory by the logical sacrifice of his whole preceding argument. 



But, it must not be forgotten that the foregoing calamity 

 to Spencer's argument is only one way of considering the 

 evolution of man not the only way. In Darwin's advocacy 



'See p. 53. 



