91 



psychical processes were supposed by Spencer to be produced, 

 and so explained, by the physical, concerning which there 

 was no doubt expressed, but he now finds it necessary to ex- 

 plain the physical by the psychical, inasmuch as the former 

 is inferred from the latter. 



"We are," Spencer says, ''conscious of effects produced 

 in us by something separate from ourselves," although, he 

 also tells us, "we can never learn the nature of that which is 

 manifested to us". "Each cluster, distinguished by us as 

 an object, is a separate seat of the power with which the ob- 

 jective world as a whole impresses us. " "This power, holding 

 together the elements of the cluster * * * is thought 

 of by us as persisting, or continuing to exist, in the midst of all 

 those manifestations which do not continue to exist. " " These 

 several sets of experiences unite to form a conception of some- 

 ting beyond consciousness which is absolutely independent 

 of consciousness; which possesses power, if not like that in con- 

 sciousness, yet equivalent to it; and which remains fixed in 

 the midst of changing appearances. And this conception, 

 uniting independence, and force, and permanence, is the con- 

 ception we have of matter", in a word, the physical world. 1 



On the above showing, the external world, or material 

 substance, is not only 'unknown', but "we can never learn 

 the nature" of it. This, one would think, ought to be suffi- 

 cient to negative all discussion of it, yet Spencer proceeds, in 

 the face of this, to state the supposed characteristics of this 

 unknown and unknowable material substance. These are: 

 (1) It is absolutely independent of consciousness; (2) It 

 possesses power, if not like that in consciousness, yet equi- 

 valent to it; (3) It remains fixed in the midst of changing 

 appearances. 



As to how we can predicate that which is absolutely in- 

 dependent of anything that we know, may be, to be sure, a 

 difficult enough question; but one way out is afforded, 

 though rather loosely, by Spencer's use of the terms "mani- 

 festations", "changing appearances", etc., which allows the 

 reader to imply something other than the "manifestations . 

 Thus Spencer ascribes to what he asserts to be an unknown 

 and unknowable cause, the characteristics of independence, 

 force, and permanence; and at the same time denies these 

 characteristics to what are, for him, the known effects. We 

 are, " he says, "conscious of effects produced in us by something 

 separate from ourselves", though, when reduced to the final 

 stage, this 'something' is declared unknown and unknowable; 



'See pp. 39-42. 



