93 



and rearrangements of atoms." 1 Verworn supplements this 

 by quoting from duBois Reymond : " A stage in the knowledge 

 of nature can be conceived in which the whole world-process 

 would be represented by one mathematical formula, by one 

 immeasurable system of simultaneous differential equations 

 from which could be deduced the place, direction of movement, 

 and velocity of every atom of the universe at every moment." 2 

 Continuing, he says: "If again, we possessed 'astronomic 

 knowledge' of the physical world, as duBois Reymond ex- 

 presses it, 'w r e would, then, indeed, understand all phenomena 

 of the physical w r orld, but we would not understand how con- 

 sciousness arises, how in general a psychical phenomenon, even 

 the very simplest, comes to be'. If we had, for example, as- 

 tronomical knowledge of our brain, we should know the po- 

 sition and motion of every atom at every moment; we could 

 also follow definitely the specific physical changes, the re- 

 arrangements, and motions of atoms inseparably associated 

 with specific psychical phenomena, and 'it would be,' as 

 duBoisjReymond says, 'of undoubted interest, if with our men- 

 tal eye turned inward we could observe the cerebral mechanics 

 of a calculating machine; or if we could know of the dance of 

 the atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus 

 and other elements, which corresponds to the delight of musical 

 sensation, of the whirl of such atoms to the acme of sense- 

 enjoyment, of the molecular storm to the frantic pain resulting 

 from maltreatment of the nervous trigeminus'. We could 

 know all these if we possessed 'astronomic knowledge' of the 

 brain. We could thus convince ourselves by self-observation 

 that consciousness is inseparably associated with atomic 

 motion. But with all this it would remain forever concealed 

 from us how consciousness arises, how the simplest psychical 

 phenomenon comes to be. However carefully we might follow 

 the motions of individual atoms in the brain, we could see 

 only motions, collisions, and again motion. Thus, it is evident 

 that a mechanical explanation of consciousness, of psychical 

 phenomena, from the motions of atoms, is an impossibility 

 for us." 3 



Alfred Russell Wallace appears to have reached the same 

 conclusion in his 'Contributions to the Theory of Natural 

 Selection'. He states: " If a material element or a combina- 

 tion of a thousand material elements in a molecule are 

 alike unconscious, it is impossible for us to believe that the 



Wax Verworn, "General Physiology" (translated), Macmillan & Co., 

 1899, p. 32. 

 2 Ibid. 

 3 O.C. pp. 33-34. 



