107 



Tenet is not only most absurd and contradictious in itself, 

 but also manifestly repugnant to that very Atomic Physiology 

 on which Protagoras endeavoured to found it, and, than 

 which nothing can more effectually confute and destroy it: 

 and, also largely demonstrated, that though Sense be indeed 

 a mere Relative and Phantastical Perception, as Protagoras 

 thus far rightly supposed; yet notwithstanding there is a 

 Superior Power of Intellection and Knowledge of a different 

 Nature from Sense, which is not terminated in mere Seeming 

 and Appearance only, but in the Truth and Reality of things, 

 and reaches to the Comprehension of that which Really and 

 Absolutely is, whose Objects are the Eternal and Immutable 

 Essences and Natures of Things, and their Unchangeable 

 Relations to one another." 



"To prevent all mistake, I shall again remember, what I 

 have before intimated, that where it is affirmed that the Es- 

 sences of all Things are Eternal and Immutable, which Doc- 

 trine the Theological Schools have constantly avouched, this 

 is only to be understood of the Intelligible Essences and Ra- 

 tiones of Things, as they are the Objects of the Mind: And 

 that there neither is nor can be any other Meaning of it, than 

 this, that there is an Eternal Knowledge and Wisdom, or an 

 Eternal Mind or Intellect, which comprehends within itself 

 the Steady and Immutable Rationes of all Things and their 

 Verities, from which all Particular Intellects are derived, and 

 on which they do depend." 1 



Moral ideas are thus not dependent upon civil law, but are 

 innate principles of reason. For Hobbes also, however, 

 moral ideas presuppose reason. Reason, he says, "suggesteth 

 convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn 

 to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are 

 called the Laws of Nature", namely, the usually accepted 

 virtues of justice, gratitude, equity, mercy, etc. Thus, when 

 Cudworth speaks of "a Superior Power of Intellection reach- 

 ing to the comprehension of that which Really and Abso- 

 lutely is", 2 he is not saying anything very different from that 

 which Hobbes has already said ; and can be considered really 

 as corroborating Hobbes' position as to the 'immutable and 

 eternal ' nature of the moral virtues. 



There is a difference, however, between these two stand- 

 points. That difference is in regard to the origin of moral 

 laws. For Cudworth such laws are derived from the 

 nal Mind or Intellect", while for Hobbes they are of empirical 



^S.B. 831-2. 

 2 Ibid. 



