110 



What the Intellectualists are interested in asserting is 

 that there are certain principles upon which moral acts are 

 based, and that these principles are the determinations of 

 what is virtuous or vicious in all relations and circumstances. 

 But as soon as they come to define the nature of any particular 

 act, they are, of course, obliged to limit their statement to 

 the state of mind or will of a reasonable being, as distinguished 

 from the overt act. 



Clarke first throws out external authority and fear of 

 punishment, and bases man's conduct on the eternal fitness of 

 things; but he later brings in these as necessary to frail human 

 beings, thus adopting in such cases the position of Hobbes, so 

 far as the individual's advantage and his relation to the civil 

 law are concerned. The only difference is that Hobbes 

 stated his case from the side of human legislation, while 

 Clarke really developed a religious idealism, which had, how- 

 ever, some of the features of later utilitarianism. This double 

 aspect of the case made possible, even yet, a dispute as to 

 what motive the individual has to conform to any social 

 principle when it conflicts with his natural desires and private 

 interest. 



Practically speaking, none of the Intellectualists has really 

 destroyed Hobbes' position. The emphasis which has been 

 laid upon reason, and the arguments advanced in defence of 

 the immutability and eternity of the moral virtues had all 

 been well considered by Hobbes, as we have seen. Hobbes' 

 essential standpoint was in relation to the conditions necessary 

 for the establishment of a commonwealth, and this point 

 was overlooked by his opponents. 



4. CUMBERLAND. 



We come now to an attack from a different standpoint. 

 Hobbes is criticised because of the naturally selfish nature 

 which, it is charged, he ascribes to man as a citizen of the state. 

 The motive for the establishment of the commonwealth is 

 declared to be a purely egoistic one, calculation of the advan- 

 tages and disadvantages of the individual being the primary 

 consideration. And Cumberland (1672) states in opposition 

 to such a supposed egoism, that the community is itself worthy 

 as a community, as well as the individual, from the standpoint 

 that the interests of the individual are not necessarily the 

 same as those of society. The common good of all, he affirms, 

 is the supreme end, the standard of human action, in subor- 

 dination to which all other rules and virtues are to be deter- 

 mined. "The greatest possible benevolence of every rational 



