Ill 



agent towards all the rest constitutes the happiest state of 

 all, so far as depends on their own power, and is necessarily 

 required for their happiness. Accordingly Common Good 

 will be the Supreme Law. " J And morality is thus transferred, 

 in part, from the Reason to the feelings, namely, Benevolence. 



Cumberland, in consequence of this natural benevolence, 

 rejects Hobbes' hypothesis as to the 'nature 'of man, both 

 prior to and during his citizenship in the commonwealth. 

 The natural and original state of man is peace, and mankind 

 is urged by the most powerful motives to preserve peace and 

 avert war, since the former is associated with the pleasurable 

 feelings, and the latter with the painful feelings of envy and 

 hatred. Far more importance is therefore attached to emo- 

 tion, in the domain of morality, in opposition to Hobbes and 

 the Intellectualists. Rational insight, however, still holds its 

 place in the choice of special means, and in the performance of 

 particular actions. 



Cumberland thus opposes benevolence to natural egoism, 

 and in so doing prepares the way for the later social ethics. 

 In identifying the moral end with the welfare of the whole, he 

 represents a tendency which we find fairly permanently 

 established throughout British ethical theory; but, so far as 

 Cumberland is concerned, the nature of this 'social welfare' as 

 distinguished from the welfare of the individual, is not very 

 adequately explained, and consequently the question is still 

 open as to whether the welfare of the whole has an independent 

 existence, or whether it does not ultimately consist, as Hobbes 

 maintained, in the welfare of individuals. 



5. LOCKE. 



Locke enlarges the view of the Intellectualists by maintain- 

 ing that the mere apprehension by the reason of the obli- 

 gatoriness of certain rules is not a sufficient motive to their 

 performance, apart from the consideration of consequences. 

 In this respect he takes up a position similar to that of Hobbes, 

 and interprets "good and evil" as "nothing but pleasure or 

 pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to 

 us ". The case is the same with moral good and evil, which he 

 defines as "only the conformity or disagreement of our volun- 

 tary actions to some law, whereby good and evil (that is, 

 pleasure and pain), is drawn on us from the will and power of 

 the law-maker". 2 



*H. Sidgwick, "History of Ethics", p. 174. 



Tohn Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , 1 90, 

 Bk. II, Ch. 28, 5; Ch. 7, 3; Ch. 20, 2; Ch. 21, 17, 35. 



