112 



Yet Locke maintains against Hobbes that ethical rules are 

 actually obligatory, independent of the sanction of the com- 

 monwealth or society, and that they are even capable of being 

 scientifically constructed on principles intuitively known, 

 though such principles are not held by him to be innate. 

 He avoids Hobbes' hypothesis of a pre-social state, and pre- 

 fers to make the tacit assumption that the same psychological 

 motives have always governed the human race. Locke postu- 

 lates three laws according to which human action has been 

 governed, namely, "First, The law of God; Secondly, The law 

 of politic societies; Thirdly, The law of fashion or private 

 censure." These laws "are those to which men variously 

 compare their actions: and it is by conformity to one of these 

 laws that they take their measure, when they would judge of 

 their moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or 

 bad". 1 



Although, for Locke, these laws have all been obtained 

 through sensation and reflection, his position would seem to 

 be based on a recognition of the idea that the "law of God" 

 has more than a merely subjective existence. The law of the 

 Law-maker, that is, really exists. Although Locke had com- 

 pletely severed his connection with those who maintained the 

 innateness of moral ideas by pointing out the individual 

 differences and the uncertainty which always attaches to these 

 ideas, yet he regards moral knowledge as capable of as real 

 certainty as mathematics. "Our knowledge," he says, "is 

 real only so far as there is a conformity betw r een our ideas 

 and the reality of things." Locke says of 'things' that we 

 have copies in our minds, but in the case of mathematics and 

 morals the "reality of things" or the "archetype" is in the 

 mind itself. 2 



With reference to the motive of moral action, Locke's 

 doctrine of pleasure and pain would indicate that these factors 

 constitute the sole source of such action. But in his doctrine 

 of freedom, it may be seen that there are other factors which 

 must be considered. The decision as to the content of action 

 always proceeds from reflection. Man should not, Locke 

 contends, be determined by the first 'uneasiness', but has 

 power to pause and deliberate. The action of the will thus 

 follows the judgment of the understanding. Intelligence in 

 this way comes to play the leading r61e, and judgments or 

 moral value are the result mainly of rational insight and 



'O.C. II, 28, 13, 14. 



'O.C. Ill, 11, 16; IV, 4, 7,3. 



