115 



7. BUTLER. 



Butler l follows Shaftesbury in maintaining that the social 

 affections are as natural as the appetites and desires which 

 tend more directly to self-preservation. He goes further, 

 however, in contending that pleasure is not the primary aim 

 even of the impulses which Shaftesbury allowed to be 'self- 

 affections '; but rather that it is a result which follows upon 

 their attaining their natural ends. 



The notion of natural, unregulated egoism, according to 

 Butler, is a psychological chimera, for man's primary impulses 

 do not aim immediately at his own pleasure. Rather, it is 

 evident that the tendencies of some are as clearly towards 

 social well-being as those of others are towards self-preser- 

 vation. 



Thus benevolence is as much a natural principle in man as 

 self-love. It may be natural to be selfish, but it is also natural 

 to be benevolent. This is further borne out "from observing 

 that the several passions and affections, which are distinct 

 both from benevolence and self-love, do in general contribute 

 and lead us to Public good as really as to private". 2 



In addition to the two principles of self-love and benevo- 

 lence indicated above, "there is a principle of reflection in 

 man". "This principle in man, by which he approves or 

 disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience." 3 

 This principle "plainly tends as much to private good as to 

 public", although, Butler says, "it is commonly thought to 

 tend chiefly to the latter". Conscience, when compared with 

 the other principles of man's constitution, "as they all stand 

 together in the nature of man, plainly bears upon it marks of 

 authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction 

 of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification". Conse- 

 quently, if the interests of self-love and benevolence should ever 

 clash, conscience would be the final court of appeal. The 

 deliverances of conscience stand on a different level from those 

 of other faculties. It has regard to all the capacities of human 

 nature, and by no means confines its interest to benevolence, 

 Butler affirming that "benevolence and the want of it, 

 singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice , 

 for "we are so constituted as to condemn falsehood, unpro- 

 voked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence^ to 

 some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration 



4 692- 1752. 

 2 S.B. 205. 

 3 S.B. 206. 

 4 S.B. 194. 



